I am an experimental economist and an economics lecturer.
My research focuses on the labor market, monetary and non-monetary incentives, and employee-employer relationships.
I have a great passion for teaching, especially teaching macroeconomic courses to undergraduate students.
Reach me at: firstname.lastname@example.org
Find my CV here.
I am in the 2023/2024 academic job market.
Missing the forest for the trees: when monitoring quantitative measures distorts task prioritization
(with Ro'i Zultan)
Managers' use of remote monitoring software increased following the transition to working from home during the Covid-19 pandemic to compensate for reduced observability. Higher observability entails quantitative measures not directly related to productivity, potentially incentivizing workers to prioritize quantity over quality. For example, office workers may increase observable work hours by directing effort inefficiently. Observing the number of completed tasks incentivizes workers to perform many meaningless tasks rather than prioritize productive ones. We design an experiment where workers can allocate effort based on perceived task difficulty and manipulate the structure of the signal to the manager. We show theoretically that quantitative information in the signal distorts incentives. In equilibrium, workers prioritize productive tasks less, reducing overall productivity. Our results confirm that removing quantitative information from the signal increases productivity by shifting workers' strategies. Enriching the signal with quantitative information, however, does not have the opposite effect.
Work in Progress
CSR as a signal for employees in the labor market
(with Marie Claire Villeval and Ro'i Zultan)
Many firms engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities, advertising them among consumers, workers, and job candidates. Previous research shows that CSR increases the firm attractiveness and the number of job applications. However, little is known regarding why workers prefer to work for firms that engage in CSR, even when the activity does not affect them directly. We hypothesize that firms use CSR to signal their social values and how they treat their employees. We find that employers use CSR in a risky environment to signal to potential workers they will help them if they suffer from a personal negative shock. Workers respond to this signal by accepting more job offers in a risky environment from employers that engage in CSR. However, this holds only for male employees and employers.
Goodhart’s law in the labor market – Quantity over quality and employers decision
(with Ro'i Zultan)